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Summary  findings
Recently,  much  attention  has been  paid  in the  literature  whether  incomes  have  converged  or  diverged  does  not
on economic  growth  to the phenonmenioni  of "conditional  require  historical  estimates  of per  capita  income  as a
convergence,"  the  tendency  of economies  with  lower-  plausible  lower  limit for  historical  per  capita  incomes
level incomes  to grow  faster,  conditional  on their  rate  of  combined  with  estimates  of  current  income  in poor
factor  accumnulation.  countries  places a binding  constraint  on their  historical
Pritchett  documents  that,  regardless  of conditional  growth  rates.
convergence,  perhaps  tle  basic  fact of modern  economic  Pritchett  estimates  that  between  1870  and  1985  the
history  is massive absolute  divergence  in the  distribution  ratio  of  incomes  in the richest  and  poorest  countries
of incomes  across  countries,  increased  sixfold,  the standard  deviation  of  (natural  log)
Discussions  of long-run  convergence  or  divergence  per  capita  incomes  increased  by between  60 and  100
have been  hindered  by the  lack of reliable  historical  percent,  and  the average  income  gap between  the  richest
estimates  of  per capita  income  for  poor  countries,  and  poorest  couintries  grew  almost  ninefold  (from
Pritchett  shows  that  to draw  reasonable  inferences  about  S 1,500  to over  S 12,000).
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Divergence, Big Timel
A resurgence of interest in models of economic growth has brought discussions of
convergence,  either in the levels of countries' per capita income  or in growth  rates of per capita
income,  to the fore. Many have argued  that traditional  neoclassical  growth  models (e.g. Solow,
Swan)  predict  a tendency  towards  either  absolute  convergence  in per capita  income  (if all countries
xqzshare the same technology, savings propensity and population growth) or 'conditional
convergence,  that is convergence  to different  levels of per capita income  but to the same steady
state  growth  rates  (Barro, 1991,  Barro  and  Sala-I-Martin,  1992, 1995,  Mankiw,  Romer, and Weil,
1992). In contrast,  many  of the newer  endogenous  growth  models  predict that steady state growth
rates differ, and hence there is no tendency  to convergence  in either growth rates or levels of
income over time (Romer, 1986, Rebelo, 1991).  These differing theoretical  perspectives  and
predictions imply the  empirical question of  whether the  available data  show conditional
convergence  has received a great deal of attention.
However,  in the context  of renewed  attention  to economic  growth this focussed  attention
on (conditional)  convergence  should  not lose  sight of three points.  First, divergence  in output per
person across countries  is perhaps  the dominant  feature of modem economic  history.  The ratio
of per capita  income  in the richest versus the poorest country has increased  by a factor of 6  and
'  I would  liWe  to thank  William  Easterly,  Deon  Fihner,  Jomihan  Isham,  Estelle  James,  Ross Levine, Mead
Over, Martin  Rama, and Martin  Ravallion  for helpful  discussions  and comments.3
the stamaid deviation  of (natural  log) GDP per capita has increased between  60 percent and 100
pemrnt. The increasingly  sophisticated  econometric  testing of conditional  convergence  with the
thirty or so years of conveniently  available, internationally  comparable  data should  not obscure
that face.
Second,  absolute  divergence  is compatible  with conditional  convergence. A tendency  for
more rapid  growth  rates  with  lower  initial  income,  conditonal on other variables, is not sufficient
for absolute convergence if the conditioning  vanables (such as physical and human capital
investment rates) are themselves  are functions  of income.  I use current data on the inverse
relatiohp  between  investment tes  and levels  of incme to show  that  even with relatively strong
conditional  convergence  the data predict continued  absolute divergence.
Third, any atuempted  model  of growth  over the tmly long term must be able to rationalize
a mmber of stylized  facts  about long run growth rates  that are direct and indirect implications  of
the historically  observed  combination  of absolute  divergence  and conditional  convergence.
1)  Massive  dove gn  npr  m~pits in  I~dn  OnR
The discussion  of convergence  and long-term  growth has always been plagued by the fact
that  the sample  of cuies  for which  historical  economic  data  exists, and has been assembled  ito
2  1  haStin to poin m tha althog I use  a  w techniqe  and calcions  to make this poin and to crte
esimates  of th  magnid  of the divergence,  none  of these points  are new or would  come as a surprie to an
e  aic historia  Kumets  (1966, 1971)  pointed  out that the very low levels  of oumut  observed  in the now
nDustrialized  countries  historicaUy  and  currently  poor  countries  implies  that their long-term  growth  rates must
be qute low  relatve to modem  grOwd Morover, models  of economic  growth  based on stages, such as ltae
off' are based  on the experience  of the  irial  revohtion  m which omne  leading  countries  clearly  accelerated
their rate of growth  vis a vis the lagging  countries. Moreover,  even those arguing  the case for conditional
convergence  acknowledge  the moderate  absolute  divergence  present in the recent data (Barro and Sala-I-
Martin, 1995, Mankiw,  Romer, Weil, 1992).4
convenient form, is completely  biased 3 . Countries  that are rich now are more likely to have
devoted the resources to creating a historical time series on GDP and countries that were
historically  rich are more likly to have  the smuces  that  allow such estimates 4. However, the lack
of histrical data on incomes  in the currently  poor countnies  need not blind us to reality. Acual
data  on GDP for all counies is not necessary  to know that there has been massive  divergence  in
economic  outcomes  since  the beginning  of modern  economic  growth  around 18705. Divergence
is obvious from three facts  we do know.
One, the leading industrial  countries  have had relatively rapid and remarkably  similar
growth in output per person since 1870. The USA, currently  the richest country, has grown at
roughly 1.8 percent per annum since 18706.  Over the entire period most other currenly
3  Miis  point  was  made  early  on  in ds dision  of  convergence  in the interchange  between  Baumol  (1986)
and  DeLong  (1988).
' Just knowing  the  way  the  data  is generated  is  enough  to guess  that  if we took  the  data  for the  relatively
reich  both  then  and  now  European  cmgries  and  their  off-shoots  (the  U.S.,  Canada,  Australia)  we would  find
they  have  all  had  roughly  the  same  growth  rat, as al cowries  that  were  rich  a long  time  ago  and  have  stayed
rich  grew  at  about  the  same  pace. Evans  (1994)  tests  the  hypothesis  of the  equality  of growth  rates  among  13
European  and  offshoot  cowuies  and  is  we  are  umble  to  reject  iL Countries  that  grew  much  faster  (e.g. Japan)
are now  rich  but  were  poor,  countries  that  grew  much  slower  (e.g. Argentina)  were  rich  then  but  are  now
poor.
5 The  year  1870  is chosen  for  the starting  point  for calculation  because  principally  because  much  of the
data  I use  (e.g. the  Maddison  (1991)  series  on  per capita  incomes)  begins  here. Although  Maddison  (1991)
aruges  the  period  1820-1870  was  similar  economially  to the 1870-1913period,  an argument  could  be made
that  it roughly  marks  an important  transition  in sveral couties (end  of the  Civil  War  in the USA  in 1865,
the  Fanco-Prussian  War  in 1870-1,  Meiji  Resoration  in 1868).  Perhaps  not  coincidentally,  Rostow  (1990)
dates  the  beginning  of  the  'drive  to  technologial  maturity  of the  USA,  France  and  Germany  around  that  date
(having  begun  earlier  in Great  Britain).
'  In Maddison  (1991)  US  GDP  per capita  is estimated  at $18,329  in 1989  and $2,181  in 1870  (both
expressed  in 1985  US  relative  prices). The  implied  per anum growth  rate  is 1.78  percent.5
inlistaalized couties  growth  rats  are rmarkably similar to that of the USA (table 1)'.  Hence
using  any of their  istrical growth  rates  as irepesentative  of Uriho  couty  growth would not alter
tantialy the drnce  calculalions  rported below. The  growth rats  imply that per capita
income  in the lead  countries  has increased  roughly  eight fold since 1870 (almost  exactly in the
US (8.14), obviously  less so in Great Britain (4.8) and (even more) obviously  more so in Japan
(23.9)).
'  line simiarity  over  die  loog  rm maS  lge  k,  epcialy  dtat  mosn  of dese counties grew more
slowly  dtn die  USA  be  n 187-190 ait  more smce,  epeciaLly  in the 1950673  period  addison, 1991).6
Table 1:  Average  per annum  growth  rates of GDP per capita 1870 to 1989 in the
presently  high income industrialized  countries.
Country  Growth rate
USA  1.78








Laggards  (more  than  .2  less)
Great Britain  1.32
Australia  1.48
Gainers  (more than .2 greater)
Sweden  2.32
Japan  2.70
Source:  Maddison, 1991, 1994.
Two, even  though  we lack estimates  of historical  GDP per capita for nearly all currently
developing  countries,  it is possible  to put a reasonable  lower  bound on what GDP per capita could
have been in 1870.  This section will just assume this level is P$250 (expressed in 1985 US
purchasing power parity (PPP) adjusted dollars, according  to the International  Comparisons  of
Product (ICP) methodology)  while the entire second section is devoted to defending  that level.
Three, many countries in the world in 1985 were relatively  near the lower bound on per7
capita GDP of P$250.  By relatively  near the lower bound, I mean simply  that GDP per capita
in many countries  was not greater than the assumed lower bound of P$250 by a factor that is
arger  than  the roughly  eightfold in GDP per capita that we know the rich countries  experienced,
since 1870.
Together, these three facts imply that poor countries cannot have grown since 1870
anywhere  near as fast as the presenly (and by and large historically)  rich countries because in
order for their present low incomes to be consistent with a growth rate as fast as the leading
countries they would have to have been impossibly  poor in 1870, hence there must have been
divergence since 1870. That is, we do know from historical  data that income in the industrial
countries  grew about 8 fold from 1870  to 1985. While we do not have an estimate  of GDP per
capita in Zaire in 1870, we can be sure income in 1870  in Zaire was not eightfold  less that its
1985 value of P$370'.
To go beyond that simple onclusion  and calculate  the magnitude  of divergence  requires
making some assumptions. I use two alternative  methods  to plaee a range on the magnitude  of
divergence. One way to create estimates  of the distribution  of incomes in 1870 across countries
is the followmg  three  step procedure  which I call the  truncation method; a) start from an actal
esimate Of  all cutries'  GDP per capita (in say 1960), b) begin the -backcast-  of incomes  under
the assumption  that all countries  grew into the past at the same rate as the leading country but c)
Ihis of  course  ignores  the  fact  that  the  present  national  boundaries  of Zaire  (and  many  other  cuti)
did  not  exist  in 1870. In everything  that  is said  about  "nations"  in 1870  the  phrase geographic  area  which
is  now  the  nation  could  be subsued without  changing  the  argument.  Although  the  rather  arbitrary  division
of geographic  space  into  countries  affects  the calculations  by determining  how  many  'counr  observantions
there  are.8
truncate  the historically  "backcast"  GDP per capita at the lower bound.  The tnmcation  method
of backcasting  incomes will stack many of the historical  income uestimatesu  up on the assumed
minimum income.  This potentially  gives a large overestimate  of the dispersion  of incomes in
1870. While  this is useful in creating  an upper bound in dispersion  in 1870  it may significantly
understate  divergence.
An alternaive procedure  for simulating  the income  distribution  in 1870  which  I call the
radial metbod  is to scale  current  estimates  of per capita  ines  in such a way that a) just pushes
the poorest  country  in the initial  year  (agam,  say 1960)  to the lower bound  by 1870,  b) pushes  the
leader  (the USA)  back  to its actual 1870  value and c) preserves  all relative rankings  amongst  the
other countries'.
Table 2 presents  the estimates  of the divergence  of per capita incomes  since 1870  based
on these  methods. Since  we have  assumed  that the minimum  is P$250 the ratio of the top to the
bottom income countries  has increased  from 8.7 in 1870  to 38 by 1960 and to 51 by 1985, an
almost  six fold incrase over the entire  period. With  the truncation  method  (beginning  from 1960)
9  hat is  the growth  rate  of the  lowest  country  was  imposed  to reach  P$250  at exacty 1870  and  the  rate
of the  US  was  usd for  the  growth  at  dte  top. Then  each  countries  growth  rate  was  assumed  to be a weihted
average  of  those  two  razes,  where  die  weights  depended  on  the scaled  distance  from  the  boom country  in the
beginnig  period  of the simnulation.  This  technique  'smusheso  the  distrbution  back  into  the smaller  range
between  the  top  and  bottom  while  mainaining  all cross  country  rankings.  For instance,  the formula  for
estimating  GDPPC  (the  log  of  GDP  per  capita)  in  the  ith  country  in  1870
was GDPPC,'' . GDPPC,'"°0(ltw).  where  the  scin  weight  w,  wa
w; - (1-a)*min(GDPPCl96°yps2^o  +  PCuGDPPC2G and  where  ai  is  defined by
a, - (GDPPC, 19 1 0-nin(GDPPC  9N))y(GDPPC 0-min(GDPPC  9O)) -9
we find that the standard deviation  of  (log)  GDP per capita levels has increased by over 35
peet  from .636 in 1870  to .867 in 1960, and by over 60 percent, to 1.02, in 1985. Using the
radial  method  (again, beginnin  the backcast  in 1960) the increase  in the standard  deviation  is 70
percent to 1960 and a full 100  percent by 1985.
Table 2: Estimates  of the divergence  of per capita incomes since  1870.
_  . is.1870  (Estimes)  1960  1985
Simulation  assumption:  Truncation  Radial
Ratio of GDP per capita of  8.7  8.7  38.1  51.6
richest to poorest country
Standard  deviation  of natural  .636  .513  .867  1.025
log of per capita incomes
Standard  deviation  of per capita  P$435  P$459  P$2,112  P$3,988
incomes  .
Average absolute  income  P$1657  P$1307  PS7748  P$12,662
deficit from the leader
Notes:  The estimates  in the columns  for 1870  are based on backcasting  GDP per capita for
each country  using the methods  described  in the text assuming  a minimum  of P$250.
Dispersion  measres based  on the ratios  of incomes  or the natural  logs  of income per capita
do wt  capture the entire pictre.  While acknowledging  that absolute  differences will grow as
levels increase even when the relative incomes are mainained, the absolute magnitudes  of the
differences  in per capita incomes are also of interest. Table 2 reports the standard  deviation  of
GDP per capita  and the average shortfall of GDP per capita from the leading country (the USA)
across all countries.  In 1870 the average income difference  was between P$1307 and PS1657
(depending  on the method). By 1985 this absolute income gap had grown by nearly an order of
magnitude, to P$12,662.10
Figure 1 shows  the tncation  method  graphically. The time series of US GDP per capita
since  1870  (shown  as a smoothed  log  trnd  with a break  in 1960) shows  the growth of 1.7 percent
per ammmn,  from an 1870 (smoothed)  GDP per capita estimate  of P$2181.  Some  representative
poorer countries  (in 1960)  are also displayed  to show  the effect of assuming  that they grew also
at 1.7 percent  per annum  until  reaching  the  mininmum  level of P$250. The figure shows  that with
the truncation  of the simulated  historical income levels of the poor counties as they hit the
assumed  minimum  the income  gap closes  and dispersion  of incomes  falls'°.
This basic  finding  of divergene is robust to alternatve assumptions,  as shown  in table 3.
Even  much  lower  levels of GDP per capita than are reasonable  for 1870  sdll indicate  substantial
divergence. Cohlumn  1 of table  3 shows  the rsults if the lower  bound were assumed  to be P$200,
the standard  deviation  stil increases  from .567 to .867.  Since income  in the USA increased  by
4.6 times  from 1870 to 1960  all countries  whose incomes  in 1960  are less than  4.6 times higher
than whatever  minimum  level is assumed  must have had lower  growth than the USA and hence
a smaller ratio of 1960  to 1870 GDP per capita than that of the USA and hence the dispersion
must have  increased. At a minumum  level of P$250, 49 countries  (of 117  in the sample) would
reach  the lower  bound  before 1870  if they  were asmed  to have  the growth rate of the US (which
they would  have  to do to prevent divergence),  while 32 cunties  reach the even lower bound  of
P$200.
Column 2 of table 3 shows results  using the tuncation method but instead of assuming
m0  The  graphs  proviles  a convenme  way  of  summarizing  the  four  things  we need  to calculate  an estimates
of  historical  divergence  even  wiffiout  real  data  on poor  countries  historical  GDPPC;  GDPPC  of  the USA  in
1960,  income  of the  US  in 1870,  income  of the  poor  counries  in 1960,  and  a lower  bound  on GDPPC.Figure  1:  Simulation  of  divergence of  per capita  GDP, 1870-1985
(showing only selected countries)
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countries grew at the US rate, backcasts  using each countries' actual post 1960 growth rate
calculated from the PWT5 data".  Again there is massive absolute and substantial relative
convergence,  the estimated  standard  deviation  in the initial period is only higher because  more of
the poor countries  stack  up on the minimum,  because  growth  rates were on average  more rapid
in the post 1960  period than  the historical  growth  rate of the USA.
Colunm  4 of table  3 does  the divergence  calculations  going  back  to 1820,  rather than 1870,
using  the tnncation  method  and P$250. To do this we use the growth rate of the UK, which  was
the leading  country  during  this period' 2. The obvious  implication  is even greater divergence,  as
the UK had already  embarked  on relatively  rapid growth. In 1820  the ratio of top to bottom  is
5.8 (versus  51.6 in 1985),  the standard  deviation  of (In)  GDPPC is .49 (versus 1.02 in 1985)  and
the average  income  gap is P$1058  (versus  P$12,662).
Alternatively,  rather  than  examine  the implications  for the distibution  of income  at various
assumed  levels  of initial GDP per capita, one could ask the question,  how low would  GDP have
to have been in order for there not to have been divergence? In order for the dispersion  of
incomes  in 1870  to have been as large as in 1985 the per capita income in the poorest countries
would  have  had to have  been  P$50. As  will be detailed  below, this number  is far, far lower than
is plausible  or even possible.
"  Although  given  the  very  low  persistence  of  cross  country  differences  in growth  rates  over  time  this  is
not  as good  an idea  as it might  seem  (Easterly,  et al, 1993).
1  This  reveals  a body  buried  in  the  previous  calculations,  that  for simplicity  the  USA  is aumed tO be the
leader  al the  way  back  tO 1870,  when  in fact  the  USA  did  not  ovetake  the  UK  until  some  time  in  the 1890s.
lherefore we only  use  the  growth  rate  that takes  the UK from its 1820  level  to the US 1870  level  rather than
its own.12
Table 3:  Robustness  of est_mtes of historical  divergence  since 1870.
1870 (Estmates)  1820  1960  Population
(Est.),  weighted
P$200,  Using  TP$250rn  1870  1960




Ratio of GDP per  10.9  8.7  5.8  38.1  8.7  38.1
capita of richest  to
poorest  country
Standard  deviation  .567  .706  .492  .867  .167  .197
of natural log of
per capita incomes
Standard  deviation  P$466  P$476  P$264  P$2,112  P$16  P$71
of per capita
incomes in 1985 PS
Average income  PS1674  PS1533  PS1058  PS7748  PS1630  PS7730
g ap_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Notes:  Column 1 carries out the same simulation  as the base case with radial
rescaling  assumptions,  only using P$200 as the minimum. Column  2 simulates
GDPPC in 1870  using actual post 1960  growth rates and truncation  at the minimum.
Columns 4 and 5 use population  weights.
Population  weights  (using  1960  populations)  do nDt  make much difference  to the increases
in divergence.  Obviously,  India and China dominate  any kind of population  weighted  analysis  of
income. Since  both are relatively  poor in 1960 this makes the weighted  standard deviation  much
lower  in 1960  than the unweighted  but the percentage increases  in the standard deviations  of per
capita income between 1870 and 1960 are about the same.
The consideration  of the role of India and China, two countries which account  for more
than a third of the world's population, does raise a conceptual difficulty implicit in any cross-13
coutry analysis. If the question  of interest  is about  the growth  experience  of nations, and it often
is as growth theorizing is about the experience of countries since economic policies (e.g.
monetary,  trade, and industrial)  policies  are pursued at the national  level, then China and India
each  should  count for roughly  one observation  each3.  On the other hand if the question  is how
individuals  fare then the performance  of China and India as particula countries  matr  a great
deal.  For instance,  suppose  we run a 'convergence regression  and find that poorer counties
grow  modesdy  faster and suppose  that one of the observations  grows much faster than predicted
(has a large positive residual). If we also know that country  happens  to be China that will not
alter the regression  line  much, which is our answer  to the question  'how fast is the typical  poor
country  expected  to grow?' but it will completely  alter the answer  to the question  'bs  fast is the
country in which the typical  person lives  growing?'
There is another se  in which population  weighu are important for these income
divergence  calculations. Since current national  population  growth  rates are inversely  relatd  to
per capita income  then divergence  at the national level in per capita incomes  will tend to imply
even greater divergence  at the indvidual level.  Between 1960 and  1993 the fraction  of the
world's population living in the high income countries of the OECD fell from 19.7 to 14.1
percent.  Since population  growth is already much slower in these high income counties this
fraction is forecast to fall further to 10.5 percent in the year 2025 (World Bank, 1995).  I'e
combination  of absolute  divergence  and demogaphic  changes  implies the rch  get both richer and
13  1  ay 'roughly'  one  observaion  each  us  therb  is the  possibiLity  dat the  error varnce in GDP  growth
raes is lower  the  larger  the  populon anx  hece dese  coimies  should  get  some  addiional  weight,  but  alm
certaiy not  a weight  proportional  to their  populations.14
fewer.
If one  accepts  the  assmption  of the lower  bound  on  historical  GbP per capita  then the fact
of massive  divergence  is establishod  and the reader  can skip  the next  secton, which  defends  this
assumption.  The fmal  two sectons, show  that massive  and continued  divergence  is compatible
with  even  strong  conditional  convergence  and examines  the implications  of absolute  divergence
for various  growth  theories.
TT)  Wa}  t wak  the  1nweg  level  nf  IiIa:
The  pesent e  iq  for  calculaig divergence  obviously  hinges  on the estimate  of how
low GDP per capita  could  have  been  in the poorest  counries in 1870. There  are five  ways  of
calting  this  minimum;  a) esimates  of  current  counties,  b) poverty  line  calculations,  c) caloric
intake, d) relationship  of icome to health  indicators  and e) historical  data. All five of these
mnethods  are  consistent  with  using  P$250  as a conervative  esfimate  of a lower  bound  on GDP  per
capita  and are emphatically  incompatbl with  using  estmates  that are substaially lower.
Before delving  into these  calculadtions,  it is import  to stress  that the effects  of the
exchange  rate adjustment.  The ICP methodology  attempts  to adjust  the exchange  rates  used in
creating GDP estimates  in a common  currency  such  that GDP per capita  figures  expressed  in
PPP$ represent  purchasing  power  over an equivalent  bundle  of goods. This adjusuent raises
estimates  of GDP per capita  markedly  in poor countries,  primarily  because  non-tradables  are
typically  much  cheaper  in poorer  counties. The PPP  adjusted  estimates  and the GDP  per capita
figures  at official  exchange  rate rates  (which  is how  they are nearly  always  reported  in standard
UN, World  Bank  and IMF or even  historical  sources)  are not at all comparable,  having  seen  an15
estimate of GDP per capita of US$100  or less is not inconsistent  with the proposed minimmm.
The predicted  GDP per capita at official  exchange  rates of a typical country  with PPP GDP of
P$250  is only around  US$70".  Because  of this important  difference  between  PPP adjusted and
official  exchange  rate dollars  the notation  P$ for 1985 PPP adjusted  dollars  and US$ for figures
at official  exchange  rates will be used hereafter.
2)  Cnntemparanenutn  CMP. The GDP per capita figures from the PWT5 suggest that
P$250  is quite  low  as an income  floor. The lowest  estimate  of  GDP  per capita  averaged  over five
years in the PWT5 is P$275 for Ethiopia 1961-65  and the next lowest  is P$278 for Uganda  in
1978-82's. The countries  with the next lowest  level of GDP per capita ever observed, even for
a year, are Tanzania  P$260 (1961)  and Burundi  P$299 (1965).
The level  of P$250  is extremely  low even by the standards  of poor countries. As shown
in table  4 using  this PPP adjusted  standard  the lowest  obsmved  GDP  per capita since 1960 in India
is P$582  (1961),  in Bangladesh  P$457  (1972),  in Haiti P$826  (1967),  and in China P$498 (1962).
The proposed  minimum  is only three fifths  the level of the poorest either Mali or Malawi  have
ever  been since  1960  and only  40 percent  of the lowest  India's income has been since 1960. This
If GDP  per  capita  figures  from  Penn  World  Tables,  Mark  5 (henceforth  PWT5)  from  Summers  and
Heston,  1991  are  regressed  on  World  Bank  figures  at  las  exchange  rates  for 1985  in double  log  form  then
the elasticity  of the official  exchange  rate  GDP  with  respect  to PPP  exchange  rate GDP  is between  1.15
(developing  coumy  only  sample)  anxd  1.30  (full  sample).  Tbis  implies  that  the  ratio  of  unadjusted  to adjusted
GDP  falls  as income  falls. For instance  the  predicted  level  of non-PPP  adjusted  GDP  per  capita  at  $200  is
US$52  (ratio  3.84),  P$300  is  US$92  (ratio  3.26),  P$600  is US$204  (ratio  2.94),  P$2000  is $816  (rado  2.45).
'5 MTe  lowest  for any country  in any  year was P$220  in Uganda  in 1981. Uganda  at that  time was  in the
inddle  of serinos  internal  unrest  and  GDP  per capita  fell  from  P$325  in 1977  amd  recovered  to P$346  by 1982.
Uganda  is likely  to have  been  below  a level  that  was  susuinable  in 1981.16
appeal to comparsons with contemporary  levels is admittedly  an argument that appeals entirely
to common  sense assessments  of the plausible. Nevertheless,  it is difficult to imagine  that even
in 1870  India, where 71 percent of the population  in 1989 lived in absolute  poverty (Chen, Datt
and Ravallion, 1993), was three times as poor as it is presently (see section  .e  below for
historical evidence on India), or that Malawi (P$543), where half of children under five are
chronically  malnourished,  was ever twice as poor.
Table 4:  Lowest observed  GDP per capita over the 1960-88  and the most recent
PWT5 estimate  (either 1985  or 1988) in 1985  PPP $ in various countries.
Country  Lowest  GDP per capita  Most Recent
(year)  (1985 or 1988)
Uganda  _  220 (1981)  443
Tanzania_260  (1961)  488
Ethiopia  262 (1960)  332
Bwunudi  I 299 (1965)  552
Other selected  countries  _
Mali  398 (1969)  474
Malawi  406 (1964)  543
Bangladesh  457 (1972)  700
China  498 (1962)  2308
India  582 (1961)  786
Haiti  826 (1967)  877
Source: PWT5 (Summers  and Heston, 1991).
h)  Perty  .Line.  An alternative  way to calculate the minimum  level of GDP per capita
is to use an internationally  comparable  poverty line.  Ravallion,  Datt, and van de WaUe  (1991)17
reviewed  official  poverty  lines  tbroughout  the world and found that the lowest  defensible  poverty
line was $21 per person per month (in 1985 PPP $)"6. Therefore an individual with annual
consumption  expenditures  lower than P$252 is considered  to be in 'extreme absolute  poverty."
This poverty line is tmly uextreme as a less pemnrious  poverty of line of PS372 per year (the
poverty  line  used  by poor cuntries such  as Indonesia,  Bangladesh,  Nepal, Kenya, Tanznia,  and
Morocco)  was used to calculate  "absolute  poverty" as opposed  to "extreme  absolute  poverty." 17
What is the relationship  beween this  povety line  and GDP per capita? First, this poveny
measure is based only on personal consumption  expenditures, which, even in a very poor
economy,  are only a frction of GDP. The average  sbare of personal conspon  expenditurs
in the PWT5 data set for those  counties with GDP per capita less than $400 is 75 percent. So
mean personal consumption  expenditure  of $252 would typically  require a GDP per capita of
$336.  Second, GDP per capita is an average  of incomes  and since distributions  of income are
skewed (they have a long right tail) the median  individual  is sbtanty  poorer than the mean
income. Most individuals  consie  substantially  less than  e mean.
Therefore, if GDP per capita were P$250 then about the most personal consumption
expenditures could be is P$225 11. If  we assume a  typical income distribution with mean
16 This  fge  comes  from  two  sources.  First,  haens  to be the  povery line  of one  very  big  aind  quite
poor country,  India. Secondly,  if (the log  of) existng  povey lines  across  countries  are regressed  on a
quadratc  m  average  mean  conunptae, dis figure  is  d  poverty  line  predicted  for the  country  in their  sample
with  dte  lwmest  mean  comptio  per  person  per  year  (Salia.  at S264).  The  figure  of $21  is acuaBly  based
on  the latest  revision  of the  exchange  rates  in the  Penn  World  Tables  (Chen,  Datt,  and  Ravallion,  1993).
'7 For  cmpron,  the  povery  line  in  the  U.S.  in 1985  was  $228  per  person  per month  ($10,989  per year
for non-farm  family  of four)  more  than  ten  times  the  proposed  poverty  line  of $21  per month.
" This  assumes  peral  coampt  is  90  percent  of GDP. This  is conservative  as it is much  higher  than
the 75 percent  average  for poor  countries  but  is less  than  100,  which  is necessary  as there  must  be some18
expenditures  about 30 to 50 percent higher than the median then median personal consumption
expindus  would  be between  P$173 and P$150.  Assuming  a GDP per capita as low as PS250
implies that half of individuals  would be consuming at levels far percent below the line for
exte  absohlte  poverty.  It alo  seems  hard to believe  consumpton levels at, or especially, very
far below  this level would  be physically  and demographically  sustainable' 9 .
C45al  icintke.  A complementary  calculation  to the poverty line is a simple calculation
based on caloric intakes. This type of "minimum  caloric  requirment"  calculation  is decidedly
(and for various reasons, rightly) out of favor, but is sufficient  for a conrte  ill  ion  of the
point at hand.  Say average caloric  inteak per person per day in a poor country consistent  with
working productively  is a per person average  of 2000 to 240P.
The data  on national  aage  daily  per capita  caoric itake and per capita GDP to establish
a relationship  a cross sectonal relationship. Table 5 shows  the predicted  levels of daily caloric
intake in 1961 for various levels of GDP per capita.  At P$250 the predicted level of caloric
invesiment  even  io maintin a low  capil/output  ratio  and  some  goverment  expeoditures.
'This  argument,  da people  lving  so  far  below  Ihe  poverty  line  is acully compatible  with  large  absohlte
numbers-of  people  living  below  the poverty  line, is  true bec  the average  .depth of poverty  is typically
very  small. flat is, if  fthe ape of  the  in  e dibu  funion is quite  steep  around  the  povery line  then
large  numbers  of individuals  can  live  in povery  even  if not  very  many  are livig far  below  the  povery line.
For instance,  in South  Asia  in 1990  where  33 percent  of the population  was ling  ia  extreme  absolute
poverty"  only about  10 percent  of the poulaon  woldd  be livig at less than  P$172  (my esmates frm
extrapolations  of cumulative  distrt  reported  in Ce  Dant  and  Ralion,  1993).
X lhe two  figures  are  based  on  difft  aum  _pdm  about  die weight  of adult  men  and  women,  the  mean
temeaue  and  die  demographic  sauctwe. The  low  figu  is about  as low  as one  can go  because  it is  based
on  a very  young  popuLatid,  39  percent  tunder  15  (die  yomg  ned fer  calories),  a physically  small  population
(men's  average  weight  of  only  110  poumds  and  women  of 88),  and  a temperatre  of 25 C (FAO,  1957).  The
baseline  figure,  althouh  based  an  demogrphic  wu  mre,  uially works  out  to be closer  to 2400  (FAO,  1974).19
consumption  is only 1544  far less than even the lower required minimum  of 2000.
Table 5: Predicted  caloric  intake for various  levels of per capita






Notes: Predictions  are based  on a cross country  log-log  regression  of
ansmml  average  caloric  intalc data (FAO) on PS GDP per capita  from
the PWT5 and a trend.  The regression  estimates,  using instrumental
variables  to account  for measurment error, are (t-statistics  in
parenthesis):
ln(Daily Calories  per person)=  6.263  +.1955  *ln(GDP  per capita).
(2Rs  (fi7 48
Of course, the fact that many countries  do have caloric intake consistently  below the
Ufru  n  does  bring  into question  the concept  of a minimum  level. Nevertheless,  it is clear
that  low levels  of caloric  intake (and of other nmtrients,  particularly  proteins)  are associated  with
greater  degrees  of malntrition and morbidity  and that these problems  get worse as calorc intakes
fall.  Table 6 shows  the lowest levels of caloric availability  ever recorded  in the FAO data for
various countries. Nearly  all of the episodes  of average  daily caloic  consumption  below 1600
are associated  with nasty episodes  of  natural (e.g. drought) and/or man-made  (e.g. civil wars,
the Great  Leap  famines in China)  catastrophe  and generally  with greatly increased  mortality  and
morbidity.  Again, this is loose  but suggestive  evidence  that incomes very much below P$250
would produce  nutritionally  and demographically  precarious  outcomes.20
Table 6:  Reported  caloric intake for countries  in selected  years with exrmely  low
intake  and the associated GDP per capita.  ________
Country  and year  GDP per capita (P$)  Daily caloric intake
Somalia  (1975)  816  1610
Ethiopia  (1985)  325  1550
Chad (1984)  418  1443
China (1961)  536  1586
Mozambique  (1987)  885  1584
Source: FAO for calorie  data, Summers  and Heston (1991) for income.
Another  way  to calculate  how  low  GDP could  possibly  be within the framework  of caloric
equ  is to assume  that  all cabric rqiements  were  to met entirely  by rice (which it isn't,
even amongst the poorest in rice growing regions).  Since milled rice has a caloric content in
consumption  of 2400  per kg meetig minimmn  intae  would  require between .83 to 1 kgs of rice
per person per day.  The average retail price of milled rice in Asian countries in 1985 was 30
cents  per kg (RRI, 1987). Therefore  just the purchase of rice for caloric sufficiwncy  would cost
between  US$91  and US$109.5 21. Since even in the poorest countries  (or amongst  the poorest in
poor countries)  the food share  in the budget  rarely exceeds 70 percent, this budget for rice would
imply per person consumption  expendiure between P$130 and PS156 per year22. Scaling  this
personal consumption expenditure up  as  before by  asuming  that  personal consumptio
21 These  are  in US  doUlars  b  e rice  is a tadable  commodity  and  so no isu  of comparing  purchasing
power  arise.
22 Expenditure  surveys firom  various countries  show  that typical  vahles  of die  food share for the poorest
(defined  as lowest  10  or 20 percent)  and  the average  (in  parenthesis)  are; Bangladesh  (81/82)  72.9  (66.2),
India  (Rural,  1983)  76.1  (65.5),  Ghana  (1987188)  70.7  (69.1),  PIinies  (1985)  69.3  (53),  Cote  d'lvoire  71.1
(48.9),  Guatemala  65.9  (54.8).21
expenditures  are 90 percent of GDP implies a GDP per capita between P$144 and P$173.
Therefore  even under the most incredible  and unrealistic  assumptions  of a subsisence economy
in which  everyone  in the economy  has the same income,  and ate only rice, and ate only enough
rice to meet nutritional requirements  the GDP per capita is still three times higher than P$50
(which  was previously  shown  to be the mmm  assumption  on 1870  GDP per capita that implied
no divergence).
d)  T-leltbh  !TMi.  The strong  (and  I woUld  aru  caSal, Pritcht  and Summers, 1994)
relationship  between  level  of income  and health is well-known. Tbis implies  that as an economy
gets poorer  the lIffe  expctncy  of its population  will fall. However, life expectancy  can only fall
so far and stfill  be compaible  with what  is known  about  population  stability  and population  growth
rates.
Table 7 shows the reuts  of estimating  a relationship  between life expectacy  or infant
mortality  and per  capita  income  and a tend term  using  either  wrrent data (PWT5  data on incomes
combined  with  World  Bank  data  on bealth  indtors)  or historical  data (Maddison  (1991)  inome
data  with infant  mortality  from historical  sources). These equations  are used to predict what life
expectncy or infant  mortality  would  have been  in 1870  at various  levels of income. At per capita
mcome  of P$200 both  rssion  models  predict  either  impossibly  high (1044) or demographically
implausible (844) levels of infant mortality.  Life expecutcy  is predicted to be only 27.3 if
income  were as low as P$250 and infant mortality is sdll predicted  to be incredibly  high.22
Table 7:  Predicted levels of life expectancy  and infant mortality  in 1870 at various
levels of  GDP per capita.
Income  level  Predicted Life  Predicted  Infant  Predicted Infant
(1985 PPP $)  Expeancy  in 1870  Mortality  (per '000)  Mortality (per '000)
(from estimates  on  in 1870 (from  in 1870
current data)  estimates  USing  (from estimates
current data)  using historical
____________  ____________  _____________data)
200  26.5  1044  873
250  27.5  990  765
300  28.3  948  686
1000  34.4  712  336
2000  38.5  604  223
Notes:  The predicted  values  of life expectancy  and infant mortality  rate are based on log-
log regreSsions  reported in appndix  table 2.1.
The rate of natural increase  of population  in nearly all poor regions around this period
(1870) is reasonably well known  and is esimated to be between .25 and 1 percen.  These
figures for the rates of acual naural increase are not consistent  with life expectncy  or infant
mortality  much  lower  thDn  the  iages  predictd for an income of P$250.  Income below this level
is unlikely to produce the conditions  necessary  for growing populations.
e)  Rlistnricai  dnata. The four arguments above have relied on the same basic intuitive
counter-facuala  argument  for establishing  a lower bound GDP per capita estimate: that if income
a For  ime,  Livi-Basci  (1992)  rep  esdmates  of population  growth  in Africa  between  1850  and 1900
to be .87  percen  and .93  percent  between  1900  and 1950,  while  growti  for Asia  is estimated  to be .27 1850
to 1900  and  .61  1900  to 1950.  Clark  (1977)  esdmates  the population  growth  rates  between  1850  and  1900  to
be .435  percent  in Afica and India  and  lower,  .33  percent  in China.23
were (much)  below  P$250  in 1870  li  would  have been too nasty, brutish and short.  This is not
to say that life was not in fact nasty, brutish and short in many countries  in 1870. It was. But
there  is a limit  and  the four  lines  of reasoning  above  place some strict bounds. But for those that
remain unconvinced  we can examine  what evidence  does exist  about GDP estimates  in the very
long-mn for the now developing  countries.
Maddison (1994) presents estimates of  indices of  constant price GDP per  capita,
fortmately  already expressed  in 1985  purchasing  power parity adjusted  dollars, for a number of
developed  and now developing  countries  in startng in 1820.  In no case are estimates  of GDP
per capita anywhere  near the lower limit I have used in simulations. The lowest estimates  of
GDP per  capita, for India (490) and China (497) in  1820, periods in  which life was
unquestionably  difficult and living stdards  extrmely  low, are still roughly  twice the lower
bound I have used of P$250&.
Maddison  (1991)  also estimates  GDP per capita for the Western  European  countries. In
1700  in the Netherlands  at P$1515  and of the UK at P$992. The fact that the most advanced  of
the Eurpean contries almost  300 years ago were 5 and 7.5 fold above our present  estimates  of
the minimum  incom level  is rmesing.  Maddison  (1991)  even ventures  to guess at the GDP per
capita  in Western  Euope (average)  in 1400  was only P$400. Kuznets  (1971)  estimates  that at its
trough  im  900 European  counies GDP would  have been above 1985 US$160, which, if adjusted
to P$ by a ratio of 2.5 gives and estimate of P$400.  These are still well above the line we are
X Maddison  derives  hse estimates  in 1820  fr  India  and  China  pardy  by guessing,  basd on his  hiorcal
reserch  for  India  and  background  informaion  on  China,  tha per  capia growth  was  zero  betwe  1820  and
1870  in  these  two  countries.24
using as our 1870  lower bound.
Table 8: Estimates of long-n  GDP per ca  ita in P$.
1820  1870  1950  Per nnm  growth,
1870-1950
India  490  490  502  0.03%
China  497  497  454  -0.11%
Indonesia  533  585  650  0.13%
Brazil  556  615  1434  1.06%
Mexico  584  700  1594  1.03%
Thailand  741  874  0.21%
l___ ___ ___ ___ ___  _____1890
Korea  |  680  757  0.18%
Taiwan (China)  5  564  706  0.38%
Average for 14 West  1055  1723  4813  1.29%
European  countries  and
their off-shoots
Source: Maddison, 1994.
The second  point from table 8 is that, even with this very spotty  coverage, the historical
data confirms the impression  of massive divergence. Whereas  India's per capita income was a
little less that half of the core group of richest counties in 1870, it was a tenth of the richest
countries in 1950. Similar statements  apply to all of the Asian countries, none of whom grew
faster than .5 percent per annum  up until 1950  compared to 1.3 percent average  growth in the
leaing countries  over that period. Even the Latin American countries, with reasonable  growth,
fell further and further behind.
M)  TTnr-nnditinnnl  diver&n  and c-nnditinnal  enn
In this section I do not wish to take issue with, nor even survey, all of the isses
surrudn  the estimation  of the magnitude  of conditional  convergence. I only wish to make the25
obvious, but nevertheless  practically important  and sometimes  overlooked,  point that absolute
divergence  and  conditional  convergence  are compatible  propositions'.  Conditional  convergence
need not imply absolute convergence,  and that the estimates  of growth factors  with the current
data do not predict convergence  for the world at large well into the future.
If we are examining  the convergence  or divergence  of relative (i.e. natural log) per capita
icomes then  a neesary  condmion  for absolute  convergence  is that the growth rate must be faster
for countries  with  lower  Ilvels  of GDP per capita. On the other hand -conditional"  convergence
means  that  growth  is faster  the lower  GDP per capita when controlling  for some  particular  set of
cozlitionpg variables. Table  9 shows  a set of regressions  using the standard  PWT5 data set (on
which  nearly all regressions  of this type  are run).  Column 1 shows  absolute  divergence. If the
growth  rate from 1960  to 1988 is regressed  on the level of GDP per capita  relative to the leader
then the coefficient  is positive. On average, rich countries  grew faster (a point acknowledged  by
all,  Nuxoll, (1994))96. Column 2 shows conditional  convergence.  If investment rates and
enrollment rates are included in the growth regression  then, conditional  on the flow of gross
invesmnt in physical  and hmun capital, a lower  GDP per capita predicted  a faster growth rate.
Columns  3 and 4 show  that the conditioning  variables, investment  in physical and human
capital, are themselves  positively related to per capita income.  That is, enrollment rates and
investment  rates  are higher for rncher  economies. The total coefficient  on initial income relative
8  This  1 ackowledged,  even  suesaed,  by  some  of the  original  authors  on  condtional  convergence  as one
of dLir  reaons  for  focusLg  on coxlitional  convergence  was  to counter  the  emphasis  placed  on the  absolute
divergence  (Barro  and  Sala-l-Martin,  1995,  Mankiw,  Romer,  Weil,  1992).
26  For illustrative  purposes  and comparison  with the exisng lirre  I am ignoring  the fact  that
investment  rates  and  enrollment  rates  are enormously  horrible  proxies  for the accmulation  of physical  and
humn capal, reqectively.  For  these  samples  the average  share  of investment  in GDP  is uncorrelated  with
the  rate  of growth  of  the  capital oDck  (Pritchett,  1994)  and  enrollment  rates  are  negadively  correlated  with  the
growth  of human  educational  capital  (Pritchett,  1995).26
to the leader  on the growth rate is easily derived from the simple system of equations;
g  - P *OYP)+a,*(NV7GDP)+uaHs&ro
NVIGDP  a y,*ln(YPC)
E;I)O  - YH*In(YPCO)
dg  *  p+al*yl+aH*Y
lnV7TC
Workng out these (simplistic)  formula  sho  (reassrngly)  that once the positive effect of initial
income  on investment  and  emollmea  is adninto  account  the model  predicts both observed facts
of absolute  divergence  and conditional convergence.
Table 9:  Divergence,  conditional  cogence  and the relationship  of initial incomes  to
Nconditioning mves  variables, 1960-1988.
Dependent  variable:  per  Dependet  variable:
capita growth rate
Just inial  Iniil  income  Invent  Primary
income  and  leels  School
investments  Enrollment
Initial level of GDP per  .401  -.322  4.43  14.57
capita relative to leader  |(202)  (1.62)  (5.68)  (5.87)
Average.  level of investment  .067
Average enrollment in  .029
primary  school  (4.04)
Constant  2.66  -2.39  26.09  112.86
(6.43)  (2.91)  (16.04)  (21.83)
N  117  117  117  117
R-Squared  .034  .320  .219  .231
Note:  absolute value of t-statistics  in parenthesis.
This implies  that conditional  convergea  per se provides  nD  reason to predict convergence27
of per  capita incomes in the future.  If the regression of investmet  levels and secondary
enrollment rates on per capita incomes is run for 1985, and it is assumed  that the strength of
conditional  convergence  remained  constant  over the next 25 years (from 1985)  then the standard
deviation  of natural log per capita  incomes  would  incrase  from 1.02 to 1.27'.  Although  there
might be some forces-like inmasing trade integration 2' or better developing  couny  policies
(Sachs and Warner, 1995)9-that would  lead to stronger  conditional  convergence,  these would
have to be extraordinarily  powerful to overcome the tedency  to divergence.  In the above
lation to the year 2020 even tripling  the conditional  convergence  coefficient  (from -.32 to -
.96)  does not induce  absolt  convergence. Ithe  fact  that, if it were the case that poorer countries
had higher rates of investment  (in physical and human capital) they could, by virtue of their
-backwardness,'  grow faster that the leading counties, should not obscure  the fact that, on
average,  poor cnres  have  lower  rates  of investment  and hence can be epcted  to grow slower
7  The  equain  for  fte smulation  (based  on eimat  reg  in 1985  for investment  and  secondary
enrollment  and  assumed  coefficients  on  the  growth  regression)
INV/GDP=(27.4)  +(4.97)  *bn(YPCI/W)
Enroll-(94.93)  +(24.9)  *ln(YPCIYPC)  . Applyn  the  pedied growth  rates
g- -.32  *ln(YPCJ  Ci .)+(.07)*  (If  GDP)+(.03)*(E.nrolI)
fromn  this  regression  to the  (in) evels  of  GDP  per  capita  in 1985  gives  the  predicdns  for incomes  in 25 years.
2  Ben-David  (1993)  arges that  the  convergence  of incomes  in te  Europan  counties  was  brought  about
by  and  large  by  te increasing  trade  integration  among  them. It has also  been  suggested  that  the  fact  that  die
advance  countries  converged  over  the periods  1870-1913  ad  1950-1990  and diverged  over the 1913-50
perdiod  may  have  to do witb  the  very  different  degrees  of trade  integration  over  time.
29 Sacs and  Warner  (1995)  show  dtat  of  the  coutri  that  had  "minimally  acceptable*  property  rigbt and
trade  regimes  there  was  very oog condional  convergence  while  not  tedency amongst  the  odier  counties.
However  only  ten  cmuties adoally  classfied  as developing  were  among  dte  the  35 that  qulified  by this
criteria  (Barbados  Indonsia,  Jordan,  Korea,  Malaysia,  Mauritius,  Morocco,  Singapore,  Taiwan  (China),  and
North  Yemen)  while  82  developing  (and  no  developed)  countries  were  exchlded.  Whether  the  emphasis  on
the  policy  conditions  for convergence  is an optimistic  or pessimistic  depends  on one's  view  about  the  scope
for policy  change.28
well into the future 30.
Part of the reason  dhat  absolute  divergence  was the recent experience  is that, by and large,
the conditioal convergence  effect  is not large. In the simple regression  in table 9 the coefficient
of -.32 implies that moving  from having  the initial income of a extremely  poor couty  such as
India (PS617)  or a Kenya (PS635)  to a semi-industialized  country such as Yugoslavia  (PS1690)
or Turkey (PS1669)  would decrease  expected  growth by a mere .32 percentage  points whereas
the stazlard deviaion of growth  rates  in the sample  is almost  2 percenge  poitss'.  Tlhesm
conditional  convrgence advantage  of having  been  the poorest country in 1960 (Ethiopia)  versus
the richest  (USA)  is only 1.2 pectage  points. In MRW (1992)  convergence  is quite dow, with
only half the gap closing  in 35 years, whereas  in Barro and Sala-i-Mardn  (1995) show a stonger
effect  with convergence  estimates  that imply a 3 percent per year elimination  of the ga,  closing
half the original gap in 23 years.
This small coefficient  impLes  that the additional  predictive  power from  nowing  inidal
income, conditional  on knowing physical and human capital accumulation  rates, is also quite
small.  In my regressions, adding  initial income only explains an addtdonal  one percent of the
vanance  and hence, in understandig the remasons  for differing  growth rates, initial income gives
very little additional  information.
Mib  is  a satemen  abou  cnwries,  not  about  people  in the  world. Given  dt  Chiras ha  d very  rapid
growth  and  India's  growth  seems  to be accelerating  it may  be the cae dat at the in  l  vel thre Wi
be  convergence,  but  this,  like  all "global  conclusions,  depends  more  on wha happens  withi two  pardcular
coui  rader than  what  happens  to the typical  poor  country.
Thbis  appears  to be quite  close  to the effect  of -.289  (all non-oil)  ant -.366 ("intermeditew  sample)
reported  by Manliw,  Romer  and  Weil  (1992).29
This does  not  mean it may not be a very important  fmding for theoretical  purposes. Not
evely empirical  question  that is important  for theory is also empirically  important32. Whatever
its  oreca  impace  conditional  convergence  is not  the major  empirical  force driving growth,
a point  emphasized  by for instance,  Mankiw,  Romer  and Weil (1992)  in their conclusion [tjuture
research should  be directed  at explaining  why the variables  taken to be exogenous  in the Solow
model vary so much from country  to country.'
I) Implioatinn  fnr mndaLs  nf grnwth and development
The sectios above  have,  directly  or indiectly, established  several  stylized  about  economic
growth and economic  development. This section brings those together  along with some other
known  facts  about  growth  and muggems  that in order to accommodate  these facts a comprehensive
theory of economic  growth would  have to have at least four features.
A)  Right  fart  nhnnt gM=b
First, eight facts about economic  growth.
I  The last 125 years have seen massive divergence in absolute and reklive incomes.
Divergence  rather that convergence  is the primary fact about growth rates.  Any model would
have to explain why some counties  have become enormously  wealthy while others remain
desperately  poor.
2 Steady  and near equal  growth amongst  the lkaders over the long haul. Table 1 showed
that amongst the  countries that were the leaders in 1870 there has been nearly equal growth.
;  For  ibuce,  one  crhical  empirical  test  between  competing  models  of gravitaion  was  a tiny  anomaly
in  the  observed  orbit  of  Mercury  dtt Eimzem's  theory  colld  explam  while  badc  Newtoni physics  could  not.30
Moreover,  that  growth  has been  markably  stcady in the leadn  country (the US).  If per capita
mcoin in the US in 1988  is predicted  based on growth rates estimated  only thugh  data through
1930 this 58 year ahead prediction  error is only 2.4 perc3e.  However, most other countries
have  sem a more  notceable  acceleration  of growth mn  the post WWI  period, which accounts  for
the convergence  of these countries  in the US in the post WWII period.
3 The  poorest couwries have had historicaly vwy uwy low growth.  The implication  of
the lower bound that implies  divergence  also places an upper bound on the average  cumulated
growth rate.  We can calculate growth rates back to 1820 for a number of the now advanced
countries and find these growth rates  around 1.5 percent. However, if GDP per capita was
not lower than P$250 in 1820 then the highest  that growth could have been for the 12 countries
with GDPPC less than P$S500  in 1960 was .5 percent. Similarly  the very highest  growth could
have been for the 40 countries with GDP per capita  less than PS1,000 was 1 percent and the
highest for the 80 countries  with GDPPC less than PS1500  was 1.5 percent.
4  Some countres that began  poor in 1960 continued  to stagnate. Eighteen developing
counties has growth  rates  less  than zero over the 16-85  period; 28, more than a quarter of the
total, had growth rates less than .5 percent per anmum;  and 40, more than a third of the sample,
had growth rates less than 1 percent per annum34.
S Some  countis that  began  poor in 1960  have  had  remegy napid  growth. There have
a ~  ~  ~  ~
33  Jones (1995)  uses  thbis  basic  fact  of the COnstacY  of growth  to good  effect  in creating  a compeling
argument  that  the steadiness  of US growth implies  that endogeos  growth  models  that make  growth  a
finxtion  of  non-siationary  variables,  mch  as  the level  of R&D  spending  or the level  of education  of the labor
force are likely  incorrect  as they  imply  an accelerating  growth  rate (unless  several  variables  working  in
opposite  directions  just happened  to offset  each  odher).
34 Abe  division  imo  deveikped  and  developing  is using  the  crteria that  te  22 high  income  members  of the
OECD  are classified  as adeveluped-  and  all others  developing.31
also  been  episodes  of extremely  rapid  growth.  Fourteen  (of 107)  countries  had growth rates more
rapid than 4 percent per annum, and 24 countries  had growth rates more rapid than 3 percent.
Growth  rates  of this magnitude  over an extended  period are essentially  unparalleled  in economic
history.
6 (Parially  an  nplication  of 4 and S) Cross  sectionally  growth  has  aried  enonously  in
developing  countries.  Facts  4 and 5 together  bring  up one of the hmly  striking  stylized  facts about
the relationship  between  growth and initial income: not the mean, but the variance  of growth
rates.  The standard  deviation  of developing  country  growth  rates over the 1960  to 1992  period
is more than twice as large as that of developed  countries  and the range of growth rates is four
times as large35.  Figure  2 shows  the scatter  plot of growth rates by level of initial income.
Table 10:  Differences  in the average  and in the dispersion  of growth  rates between
developed  and developing  countries, 1960-90.
Developing  Developed
countries  countries
Average per annum  growth rate  1.73  2.67
Standard  deviation  of growth  rates  1.96  .83
Range of growth rates  9.6 (-2.7 to 6.9)  2.4 (1.2 to 3.6)
Number  of countries  107  22
Notes: Calculated  from PWT5.6 data, using least squares logarithmic  growth rates over the
longest  possible  span of data (generally  1960-90).
7 Growth has been much more variable not only across but also within developing
countries. The variation  of growth  rates  whin  countries  over time has also been more than twice
M Obviously  the  range  for  developing  couties will  be larger  simply  because  there  are more  of them,  but
the  expected  range  for  a normal  distribution  with  the mean  and  standard  deviaton  of the  developed  countries
with  107  observations  is 4.2 (from  4.5 to .3)  versus  the  observed  range  for developing  countries  of 9.6.Figure  2:  Growth  rates  and  initial  income
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as large for developing  countries. The average  change in growth rates (in absolute value) in
developing  countries  from  one decade  to the next  is full 3 percentage  points. Some countries  have
had growth  accelerate  enormously,  Indonesia's  GDPPC growth rate was .57 from 1960 to 1970,
5.08 percent  since. Others  have  had rapid  growth  rates  come  to a complete  halt,  Brazil's GDPPC
grew 5 percent per year until 1980, and only .06 percent yearly until 1992, Mexico's GDPPC
grew 3.8 percent per year until 1981 and .05 per year since.  Still others have seen growth
punctuated  with  huge falls  in output  (e.g. Chile's GDP per capita fell 23 percent 1972-76  and 22
percent  from 1981  to 1983). Explaining  this greater variability  of growth  both across  and within
countres seems  at least  as relevant  for a model  of economic  development  as generating  conditional
convergence.
Table 11:  Differences  in the variability  of growth  mtes  between  developed  and
developing  countries, 1960-90.
Developing  Developed
countries  countries
Standard  deviation  of the year to year GDP per  6.5  3.1
capita growth rates
Average  absolute value of the change in  2.91  1.49
individual's  countries  growth rates between
decades.
Number of countries  107  22
Notes: Calculated  from PWT5.6 data.
8 Growth  rates, especially in developing  countries, have shown very littk persistence.
Easterly, Kremer, Pritchett and Summers  (1993)  demonstrate  that the cross country correlation
of growth rates is very low, even fairly extended  periods, such as 10 or 15 years (see figure 3).Figure  3:  GDP per  capita  growth  rates  1960-1975  verus  1976-1992
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Using  the data since  1960  one finds that, if one excludes  the Four Asian Dragons  and Japan, the
correlation of growth rates over the beginning and end periods of the sample is only .1736.
R) Implir-2tinng for mndel  nf ernnf mic:  nwth
What  would  a model  look lie  that  could  generate  al of those  empincal  features? It would
seem to have to have at least four features. First,  there has to be the possibility  of very long
periods of stagnation.
Second,  the balances  of 'advantages'  and 'disadvantages"  to backwardness  need to be able
to come  out on the disadvantages  side. At least  since  Gersehenkron  (1962)  there has been the idea
of an "advantage  to backwadss"  which  allows countries  behind  the technological  frontier to
experience  episodes  of rapid growth  driven by rapid productivity  catch-up3'. While not denying
the possibility of rapid gains in productivity  is a possibility,  absolute divergence  implies that
almthough  there may be some  potential  advantages  to backwardness,  the cases in which  backward
counties, and  especially  the most backward  of countres, actually gain significantly  on the leader
are historcally rare.  In poor countries there are clearly forces that create the potential for
explosive growth, such as those witnessed in some countries in East Asia.  But there are also
strong forces for stagnation:  a quarter of the 60 counties with inidal income less than P$1000
3'  This  greater  witiin  country  varability  and  low  time  persistence  of growth  rates  are the  reasons  it is a
very  bad  xlea  to  test for convergence  using  panel  data  that  uses  shorter  time  periods.  For instance,  if output
in  any  given  year  is  equal  to a blng  run  eilrim  level  detrmined  by capital  stocks  plus  a serially  correlated
random  diurbance  den dt 'condional  convergence'  parameter  captes  both  the short-run  biss  cycle"
frequency  retum  to equiliim phs whver  long  run  convergence  that  may  exist.  Monte  Carlo  expem
that  ne  cross  country  'data that  replicate  the large  ratio  of business  cycle  to trend  and  low  persisce
of growth  rates  but  no long  run convergence  of growth  rates  show  than  using  panel  data  can overestimate
convergence  relative  to the  use of long  run  data  by several  orders  of magnitude.
37  s  ay at least  sinCe  according  to Rostow  (1993)  David  Hume  more  thn 200  years  ago  argued  dat the
accumulated  technological  advances  in the  leading  countries  would  give  the  followers  an advantage.34
have had growth rates less than zero and a third have had growth rates less than .05 percent.
There also have to be forces present for 'implosive" decline such as that witnessed in some
countries in which the fabric of  civic society appears  to have disintegrated  altogether (a point
often acknowledged  off-hand or ignored as these countries  drop out of our growth regression
samples).  Overall, the disadvantages  to backwardness  so far seem to be have been the rule.
Third, there has to be the possibility  of extended, reasonably  stable, and rapid growth.
Fourth,  there has to be considerable  variability  in growth rates, both across countries  and
within countries  over time.
A model  with these  features  will obviously be more than a model  of economic  growth, as
there are models of economic  growth and there are models of economic  development.  Since
growth  is typically  a major feature of economic  development  there is considerable  overlap in the
two types, but there are nevertheless  some very large differences. Typical  models of economic
growth (whether exogenous  or endogenous)  focus on the determination  of long-run growth in
relatively  advanced  economies,  why  it persists  and what  explains  its variations  but are not intended
to cover other features relevant  to development 38.
While it is easy to build a mathematical (as opposed to economic)  model with these
features by building in precisely the assumptions  that mimic the data reasonably well, specific
features  about the model will dramatically  affect the vision of propects for the future.  Table 12
presents simulations  of a model of growth that involves  steady state growth of the leaders, with
the poorer countries moving stochastically  between states of stagnation, steady growth, and
3  It would be taking Robert Solow very unseriously  indeed (and I do not think this is what
MRW, 1992 implied)  to act as if he intended his one sector, two (or even augmented  to three)
factor  growth  model  to 'explain' why  the US has grown steadily  and why Korea has boomed  and
why Tanzania  has stagnated  and  why the Brazilian  miracle of the 1970s  petered out.35
convergence booms (the model is described in appendix 1).  By choosing the transition
probabilities  between  the states  the model  can mimic reasonably  well both the observed  historical
divergence  and the propertes  of recent  growth  rates,  e.g high varnability,  some rapid gainers, low
persistence  (the results  are also described  in appendix  1).
While the model is built to predict divergence  since 1870, whether this model predicts
future  divergence  or convergence  in the future depends  critically  on what one assumes  about the
transition probilities out of stagnation.  The results in column I of table 12 assume that the
transtion  probability  from stagantion  is constant,  and show  continued  divergence  for the next 125
years. Results  in column  U assumes  that  policies  can influence  the transition  from stagnaton into
growth and that policies improve in the  future, in  which case there is  massive absolute
convergence. This is the optimistic  message  of Sachs and Warner (1995), that every country
which  adopts reasonable  policies  wiD  have sufficiently  strong  conditional  convergence  to create
absolute  convergence.
The results  in cohumn  m of table 12 are derived under the assumption  that the transition
probability  out of stagnation  (here classified  as growth of .5 percent per annun) increases  with
the absolute level of  income. This captures crudely  models  with  thresholds'  in which  growth
requires  a certain  minimum  level  of accmulation, or 'stages of growth' models  with a  'take-ofF'
effect  in which  after a long period  in which  the wpre-oDnditions  are established  countries  can have
rapid  growth  (Rostow,  1990). Here again, although  there has been absolute  divergence  over the
last 125  years (1870-1995)  the next 125 years could see absolute convergence  as even the slow
growth in the stangation  phase pushes more and more countries over the threshold into rapid
growth. However, with the slight change in assumptions  such that the transition  probability  out
of stagnation  is declining  with the relaive  gap in incomes  (say, successful  imitation  of the leaders36
becomes more difficult the greater the relative income gap) then the next 125 years will see
massive absolute divergence  as those that make it into the 'convergence club' get richer while
those countries  left behind  have less and less chance of joining the club (column IV).
Table 12:  Eimulations  of alernaive padis of divergence,  depending  on the assumptions  about transiton out
of sungapon  of developing  countris.
Cohmn:  I  U  m  Iv
Transition  Exogenous  (at 1.5  Exogenous  increase  m  Icreaig  with  higher  Decreasmg  with  the
fom  percent  per year)  1995  due do better  absoluthne  relaive distance  from
stagnation:  _police  (to 5 Percent  the leader
__________  ~~~~~Per  year) 
1870  1995  2020  1870  1995  2020  1870  1995  2020  1870  1995  2020
Ratio,  mm  6.6  40.7  340  7.7  44.8  13.4  7.7  46.8  2.8  7.3  45.2  276
to  max
Std. Dea.  .49  1.1  1.6  .54  1.14  .472  .53  .99  .15  .53  1.15  1.46
ln(GDPPC)
Notes: Based  on the simulaions  of the model  described  in appendix  1.
A theory that unifies  economic  growth and economic  development  must address at least
the four questions:
*  what accounts  for condtied  per capita growth and technological  progress of those
leading counrries  at the frontier,
* what accounts  for the few countries  that are able to  iutiate  and sustain  period of  rapid
growth in which they gain significantly  on the leaders?
* what accounts  for why some counties fade and lose the momentum  of rapid growth?
* why do some  countries stagnate?
Theorizmg  about economic  growth and its relationship  to the appropriate policy needs to
tackle these four important, and distinct, questions. While it is conceivable  that there is an all
purpose answer to the generic question, -what policies would be good for promoting economic37
growth?",  it seems  much  more  plausible  that  the answer  differs. Is the question  asked of a mature
economic  leader (e.g. USA or Germany  or France)?,  a booming rapidly industrializing  (or
already  industrialized)  country  trying to prevent  stalling on a plateau  (e.g. Korea, Indonesia,  or
Chile), a once  rapidly  growing  and at least semi-industrialized  country  trying to initiate  another
episode  of rapid growth (e.g  Brazil or Mexico  or the Philippines)?,  or a country still trying to
take  off into sustained  growth (e.g.  Tanzania or Myanmar or Haiti)?  Discussion of  the
appropriate policies  for economic  growth seem at times remarkably  undifferentiated,  with the
principal questions  being addressed  and the counties to which the discussion  is intended  to be
applicable  either ignored  entirely  or left implicit.
ConclusiSn
Whichever  way  the debate  about whether  there has been some "conditional"  convergence
in the recent period is settled, the fact remains  that one overwhelming  feature of the period of
modem  economic  growth  is massive  divergence  of absoute and relative incomes  across countries,
a fact which must be grappled with in a fully satisfactory  model of economic growth and
development.38
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Appendix  1: Description  of a simulation  model
The m  mtical model  is based  on simulating  a GDP per capita series (y) for each of N
counties (N = 117) over T periods based on cumulating  a series  from a starting  date;
Yt"  Y  y,A*(l  +  g,)
The set  of countries  is divided  into two, the urich"  countries  and the 'developing' countries.  In
the simulations  there  are 14 rich  counties and 103  developing  counties. For the 14 rich counties
GDPPC  in 1870  was drawn  from a uniform  distribtion  with minimum  of 1700  and maximum  of
2050. The rich countries  grew in every  period at 1.8 percent.
The developing  countries  were more complicated. The initial GDPPC was drawn from
an uniform distribution  with a minimum  of 250 and a maximum  950.  The growth rate (g) for
each  country  n in each  period  t is decided  stochastically  to be in one of four catogories:  stagnation,
g-.5  percent; a plateau g=1.8  percent; a boom where  g  - (1.8)  *(riM  country  incom  'Yy.1  5
which implies that booms are faster the poorer a country  is when it starts, but that evenatuaLly
growth  settles down to  the  'rich'  country rate;  and  an  gimplosion period in  which
g - - i.a *  v -2Soyy  , which  creates  the possibility  of lage recessions  (especially  for poorer
couries)  but with  no counay  going  below  the minimum. All poor  countries  begin the simulation
in stagnation.
The rest of the model  is given  by the matrix  of transition  probabilities  between  the various
stages, given in table Al.1.  All of these probabiites ar. constant  across all simulations  except
that for the transition  from stagnation  to growth. The transition  from stagnation  is in two stages,
from stagnation  to growth, then to either a plateu stage (.7) or a boom (.3).
Table Al. 1  Matrix of tansition probabilities  between  various growth rawe  states in the
base case simulations.
From:
To:  Stagnation  Implosion  Plateau  Boom
Stagnation  .885  .4  .1  0
Implosion  .1  .6  0  0
Plateau  .7  0  .8  .1
Boom  01  .3  0  .1  .941
The transition  from stagnation  to growth (either a plateau or a boom) is different in each
of the four simulations  reported in table 12, as described in table Al.2.  The probability of
remaining  in stangation  is determined  residually  in each case.
Table Al.2: Different  assumptions  about transition  probability  from stangation  to growth.
Column in table 12  Description  Formula
I  Exgogenous  and constant  p=.0 1 5
II  Exogenous  shift.  p=.015 up to 1995, p=.10
thereafter.
1m1  Increasing  with absolute level of  Transition  to growth if the
income.  value of test< .015, where
test=x+ .2*ln(400) .2*ln(y),
where x is a draw from a
random uniform (0,1).
IV  Decreasing  with the relative income  Transition  to growth if the
gap.  value of test<.015m,  where
test  = x
.5  *ln(top/y)  + .5*ln(top/y),
where top is the income of
the top country in the t
period and z is a draw from
a random  uniform (0,1)
The stnure  of the model  and  the transition  probabilities  were chosen  so as generate  about
the observed magnitude  of divergence  and to roughly reflect the eight facts about growth rates.
The 1870 to 1995 figures show the absolute  divergence, while Table A1.3 reports the results of
taking the last 30 years of growth rates and calculating  statistics  about those growth rates.
Table Al.3:  Summary  statistics  of growth rates over the last 30 years of a 125 year
simulation  in the base case.
Mean of growth rates  1.77
Standard  deviation  of 'developing' country  growth rates  2.3
Range of 'developing' country  growth rates  8.8 (8.02 to -.76)
Correlation  of growth rates of 'developing countries  .12
between first and last half of the period.42
Appendix 2:  Regressions of health status on income
Appendx  table 2.1:  1egression results
Dependent variable
ln(Life  EXpeC  )  ln(Infant  Mortality)  ln(Infant Mortality)
GDP per capita  .162  -.238  .593
(80.9)  (20.75)  (23.73)
Trend  NA  -.013
_  _ _  _  _  _ _  _  _ _  _  _ _  _  _  _ _  .__  _ _  _  _  _  _ _  _  _  _ _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  (3  2 .4  4  )
Trend*(since 1960)  .0043  -.026  -.0025
(17.5)  (75.7)  (14.23)
N  3643  3608
R-Squared  .675  .780
Estimation  OLS  OLS with Fixed  OLS with Fixed
Effects  Effects
Sample  Annual observations  Annual observations  Annual observations
on 136 countries,  on 136 countries,  on 22 countries,
1960-1990  1960-1990.  1870-1988.
Notes:  Absolute values of t-stadstics in parenthesis.IPolicy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
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